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ABSTRACT: This article investigates a twelfth-century realist view on universals, the individuum-theory. The 
individuum-theory is criticised by Peter Abelard and Joscelin of Soissons, and endorsed by ‘Quoniam de 
generali’ as well as by the unpublished Isagoge commentary found in MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, which is taken 
into account for the first time. The individuum-theory blurs traditional distinctions between nominalism and 
realism by claiming that the universal is the individual thing itself. Its main strategies for such a claim are 
presented, namely: putting forward identity “by indifference,” distinguishing status and attentiones, and 
neutralising opposite predicates. It is argued that these strategies have parallels in Peter Abelard’s own views. 
The individuum-theory’s paradoxical realism seems to defend universal res after criticisms were advanced 
against more traditional material essence realism and it seems to have been using some of the nominalists’ tools 
(particularly Abelardian tools) in its endeavour.  
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Much can be said about what the early twelfth-century debate on universals is not. For 
instance, it is not a discussion of which genera or species grasp the truth of things, or which 
genera or species a certain individual belongs to, or how one knows that this is so. Twelfth-
century magistri would think that the genera and species for which nouns are found in 
ordinary language, such as Animal or Man, “cut the world at its joints.” They would consider 
it unproblematic both that Socrates belongs to the genus Animal and species Man, and that 
one knows that he does.1 Similarly, the debate is not about properties of all sorts, or about 
things of all sorts. It focuses, rather, on substantial properties to the detriment of accidental 
ones and on natural things to the detriment of artefacts (these being regarded as mere 
accidental arrangements of natural things). Scholars have recognised a realist and a 
nominalist approach to the debate. Realists are addressing an ontological issue. They claim 
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that universality pertains not only to words (voces, sermones or nomina), but also to things 
(res) — in other words, that there are universal things. There is no difficult semantic issue to 
tackle on this account: universal words simply refer to universal things. Nominalists, by 
contrast, hold that all that exists is individual — no universal thing exists. The issue to tackle 
is not ontological but semantic. Some of our words, such as proper names, refer to individual 
things and thus, obviously, are meaningful (that is, able to signify something). But other 
words are universal, and they too are meaningful. How can universal words signify, given 
that there is no universal thing to which they refer? Both the metaphysical and the semantic 
perspectives are a form of exegesis. They originate from authoritative texts studied as part of 
the school curriculum (Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione, as 
well as Boethius’s commentaries on each).2 Authoritative texts transmitted both an 
ontological way of dealing with genera and species, and a predicative one. According to the 
ontological approach, a universal is a common nature that is in many individuals. According 
to the logical or predicative approach, a universal is that which is predicated of many things.3 
Now that the major lines have been established, we shall analyse a theory of this debate 
that somehow blurs most of them, the “individuum-theory.”4 It is a realist view, the core 
claim of which, however, is the nominalist claim that “all that exists is individual.” In my 
interpretation, the individuum-theory is a mitigated form of realism that developed in the time 
of Peter Abelard following criticism of material essence realism. Material essence realism, in 
turn, is a traditional form of realism claiming the existence of universal common things as 
constituents of individual things. The individuum-theory rejects universal common things 
endorsed by material essence realism, and claims that all that exists are individual things. At 
the same time, it still holds that universals are things. Given that all that exists are individual 
things, the individuum-theory therefore claims that “the universal is the singular thing itself.” 
Research on this view is scanty. Analysis by Martin Tweedale and Peter King has focused 
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primarily on Abelard’s criticism of the view rather than on positive accounts.5 More recent 
contributions by Wojciech Wciórka and Roberto Pinzani both focus on one published tract 
(‘Quoniam de generali’) and only address particular aspects of the theory.6 In particular, 
scholars have failed to take into account the Isagoge commentary of MS Paris, Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, lat. 3237, which seemingly endorses the individuum-theory. My aim is 
thus to develop a more comprehensive understanding on the basis of both published and 
manuscript sources. Moreover, I put forward the claim that parallels can be found between 
the strategies of the individuum-theory and of Abelard, a point which has not been adequately 
highlighted so far. I therefore argue that, in the twelfth-century, a form of realism was 
developed that tried to accommodate realist and nominalist claims, and defended realism 
using Abelardian tools. The article is divided into three sections. First, I will be summarising 
the basic tenets of material essence realism. Second, I will present the sources and main 
claims of the individuum-theory. Finally, I will investigate the strategies used by the 
individuum-theory and draw parallels with Abelard’s views. 
1. CRITICISING MATERIAL ESSENCE REALISM 
Realism enjoyed a venerable tradition, stretching back to Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury, 
and Odo of Cambrai, before it was endorsed by William of Champeaux in the early twelfth 
century.7 William’s realism is usually called “material essence realism.”8 Material essence 
realism is a theory that tries to explain both what is common to different individuals and what 
is peculiar to each of them, therefore taking neither of them as primitive.9 Two constituents 
are identified within a singular, individual thing, for example Socrates. One is the universal 
constituent, the species of that individual thing (Man); the other is an individual constituent, 
proper to that individual thing only i.e. the accidents of that individual thing (such as 
Socrates’s particular colour).10 The species, in turn, can be analysed in terms of two 
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constituents. Just as Socrates shares Man with all other individual men, so Man has a 
universal constituent, which it shares with all other species of the same sort, and this is its 
genus, Animal. It also has a constituent that is proper to that species only, the particular 
differences by which it is distinct from all other species of the genus Animal (rationality and 
mortality). The genus Animal, in turn, is a species of a higher genus, Corporeal Substance. 
Therefore, the same reasoning can be applied, identifying a general constituent and Animal’s 
own differences. In a nutshell, the universal is a constituent of its inferior things, be they its 
inferior species or its inferior individuals. Material essence realism highlights this by saying 
that the universal is the matter of its inferiors, to which forms (i.e. differences or accidents) 
are added to produce the inferior species or individuals.11 
The universal constituent, it is claimed, is an entity, a thing that exists in the world. Of 
course, it does not exist in the way in which individual things exist. But it, too, exists, with 
the following special ontological characteristics. A universal is a common entity existing: (1) 
entirely12 and (2) simultaneously in each inferior thing it is in, and (3) in such a way as to 
constitute the substance of the inferior thing. Three comparisons found in Boethius are 
usually mentioned in order to make the point:13 (1) The universal is not common to a and b as 
a field is common to a and b when a owns a part of it and b another — the universal is 
entirely in each inferior thing. (2) It is not common as a horse is common to a and b because 
a first owned it entirely and subsequently b owned it entirely — a universal is common 
simultaneously to its inferiors. (3) Finally, it is not common in the way in which a theatre 
show is common to all those that see it, that is, entirely and at the same time but without 
constituting the substance of the things to which it is common — the universal is a 
component of its inferiors.  
Consequently, there is an interdependence between universal and individual entities 
according to material essence realism.14 As is clear from what has been said in relation to 
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constituents, this view is a form of immanent realism: universals do not exist apart from 
inferior things but as their metaphysical constituents. A universal cannot exist without being 
instantiated in at least one individual. However, individual things also depend on the 
existence of universals for their own existence. Indeed, the universal common entity is the 
nature of its individuals — in other words, it supplies them with all they need in order to be 
what they are, while the individual contribution lies only in accidental features. This means 
that an individual cannot exist without instantiating a specific universal. Indeed, the 
interdependence seems to be in favour of the universal: a universal must be instantiated by at 
least one individual but the non-existence of any individual (provided that at least one exists) 
does not entail the non-existence of the universal; on the contrary, the non-existence of the 
universal always entails the non-existence of the individual.15 
In the first decades of the twelfth century, arguments were raised against various aspects 
of material essence realism — for instance, against its use of accidents as the principle of 
individuation.16 Arguments were also directed against the special ontological characteristics 
of universals, and the most frequent are variations of two arguments. The first: if material 
essence realism is followed through, the universal thing will have to be the subject of 
contrary properties at the same time — for instance, the universal thing will be subject to 
opposite differences by which it produces different species, such as being rational and being 
irrational, or to opposite accidents that different individuals happen to have, such as being ill, 
proper to this individual, and being in good health, proper to that one.17 The second: if 
material essence realism is followed through, one and the same thing (the universal common 
thing) will have to be entirely and at the same time in two different, possibly distant, places 
where it is instantiated.18 It is a characteristic of the medieval debate that universal entities 
are attacked not simply for being an uneconomical option on a balance sheet (albeit with the 
possibility being granted that entities with such characteristics could exist). As these 
5 
 
arguments demonstrate, common universals are considered to be ontologically impossible, 
something that simply cannot exist in the world.19 
2. THE INDIVIDVVM-THEORY 
Criticism of material essence realism is the starting-point for the individuum-theory. Before 
considering its basic tenets, however, we should present the sources for reconstructing this 
theory. The individuum-theory is described, critically, by three texts that probably date back 
to the 1120s: Abelard’s Logica ‘Ingredientibus’,20 the Abelardian Logica ‘Nostrorum 
Petitioni Sociorum’ (both defending the view that universals are words)21 and a treatise, ‘De 
generibus et speciebus’ (which claims that universals are collections of the material essences 
constituting individuals).22 It is also endorsed positively by at least one treatise called, from 
its incipit, ‘Quoniam de generali’.23 An unpublished commentary on the Isagoge found in 
MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, also seems sympathetic.24 Moreover, 
John of Salisbury mentions the view in Metalogicon II, 17 (attributing it to master Walter of 
Mortagne) and, more briefly, in Policraticus VII, 12.25 ‘Quoniam de generali’ and P17 
provide the most detailed account but all these sources are quite coherent in presenting the 
view, its terminology, and strategies. 
Accepting criticism of material essence realism, the individuum-theory has an ontology to 
which a nominalist could subscribe.26 Things, it claims, are discrete from one another not 
only in their forms (as for material essence realism) but also in their material essences. 
Things are therefore entirely discrete from one another.27 And such discrete things are 
individuals. Indeed, the theory claims that (i) all that exists is individual: “Quicquid est, 
individuum”28 and “nihil omnino est praeter individuum.”29 However, it also wants to claim 
that (ii) universals are things, in accordance with realism. Given that, by (i), the only things 
that exist are individuals, it follows that (iii) universals are precisely those things that are 
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individual.30 Socrates, they say, is Socrates, but also Man, Animal, Body and Substance. He 
is therefore an individual, a species, a genus, the most general genus.31 The same is true for 
any other individual. Consequently, the same thing is particular and universal.32  
It is, as Wojciech Wciórka put it, an “audacious” theory.33 If anything, authorities are clear 
in opposing universality and singularity and in attributing them to distinct items. In Chapter 7 
of De interpretatione, Aristotle defines a universal as that which is apt to be predicated of 
many, and an individual as that which is not.34 In the Isagoge, Porphyry states that, among 
items that are predicated, some (individuals) are said of one only while others (genera, 
species, differences, propria and common accidents) are predicated of many.35 Indeed, some 
inspiration for the individuum-theory could have been found in a passage of Boethius’s 
commentary that scholars call the “unique-subject theory.” In this passage, Boethius says that 
the subject of singularity and universality is one and the same, just as the same line is 
concave and convex with respect to different points of view.36 However, Boethiusʼs overall 
aim is to say that things exist as singular in the world, whereas they can be thought of as 
universal (through abstraction). He certainly did not mean that the singular thing also exists 
as a universal.37 Aristotelian immanentism could also have provided some sort of antecedent, 
because of its claim that universals are always instantiated. This means that, in act, only 
individuals exist. A universal exists even if it is instantiated only by one individual (as is true 
for the phoenix). However, although universals always exist in individuals or indeed in the 
individual, they are certainly not the individuals themselves on this account.38  
One might wonder, therefore, why a view claiming that the individual thing is a universal 
was defended. It certainly is an aspect of the twelfth-century debate that it tried to defend, as 
cleverly and ingeniously as possible, difficult and counterintuitive positions. The individuum-
theory, however, has more to recommend itself and does not lack philosophical interest. It is 
an attempt at defending realism (and thus honour the thought that universal predications are 
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true in virtue of something extramental)39 without committing to universal common things 
existing at the same time in different individuals. The individuum-theory is also relevant from 
a historical point of view, documenting a form of realism much more palatable to nominalists 
than material essence realism. Closeness to nominalism is evident in accepting criticism of 
material essence realism and in claiming that individuals only exist. As the next section will 
make clear, this view also uses strategies and terminology reminiscent of Abelard’s for a 
purpose (defending realism) which is the opposite of Abelard’s own purpose. 
3. STRATEGIES FOR THE INDIVIDVVM-THEORY 
Three main strategies are used by the individuum-theory for supporting its claims: 
introducing a new sort of identity, identity by indifference; identifying different states (status) 
of the individual thing, each corresponding to a certain attentio on the observer’s part; and 
finally, neutralising opposite predicates. My contention is that all these strategies have 
parallels in Abelard’s own works.40 
  3.1. Identity by Indifference  
According to material essence realism, individuals of the same species and species of the 
same genus share a common entity, essentially the same in each individual or species. We 
should therefore draw a distinction between (i) the identity of the species (or the genus) in its 
inferiors and (ii) the identity of individuals of the same species, and of species of the same 
genus among themselves. On the basis of the description of material essence realism in 
LNPS, things that are identical according to the first kind of identity are “the same 
essentially” (idem essentialiter), and things that are identical according to the second kind of 
identity are “the same in essence” (idem in essentia).41 Essentially the same thing is found in 
each individual of the same species — such a thing is, precisely, the species. Essentially the 
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same thing is found in each species of the same genus — such a thing is, precisely, the genus. 
Consequently, individuals of the same species are the same in essence (or, following the text 
more closely, are not different in essence) because they have one and the same matter, the 
species. Similarly, species of the same genus are the same in essence because essentially the 
same thing (the genus) is in each of them. On the one hand, a and b are essentially the same 
when they are, in fact, the very same thing (thing being a standard meaning for ‘essentia’ in 
the twelfth century). On the other hand, a and b are the same in essence when they share the 
same essentia, which in turn is taken as a universal thing, identical with neither a nor b (in 
this case the meaning of ‘essentia’ as matter seems to prevail).42  
According to the description of material essence realism in P17, however, things that are 
identical according to the first kind of identity are “the same in essence.”43 Similarly, Abelard 
seems to call this identity “in essence.” According to Abelard, two items a and b are the same 
in essence when they are, in fact, the very same thing. Tullius and Cicero, for instance, are 
the same in essence. This ensis and this mucro are also the same in essence (‘ensis’ and 
‘mucro’ are two Latin synonyms meaning sword, and they are additionally taken here to refer 
to one and the same sword). This white item and this hard item are also the same in essence 
under the assumption that ‘white’ and ‘hard’ refer to one and the same thing here. 44 In other 
words, a and b are the same in essence when they are not two things but rather one. Stated 
differently, a and b are the same in essence when they have all their parts in common.45  
Abelard’s identity in essence corresponds to the first sort of identity for material essence 
realism. At first sight, it seems not to correspond to the second kind of identity for material 
essence realism (identity among individuals of the same species and among species of the 
same genus). After all, individuals differ through their forms and species through their 
differences — they can hardly be said to be exactly the same thing. However, one should 
keep in mind that, according to material essence realism, the species is all that is substantial 
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to an individual, that is to say, all that makes an individual what it is. Accidents only are 
added to the species to produce individuals and there is evidence, at least in some accounts, 
that material essence realism tends to consider differences as accidents.46 Seen from this 
perspective, when individuals of the same species are said to be the same in essence, the first 
and more radical meaning of identity in essence can also be seen lurking in the background.47  
The individuum-theory similarly maintains that individuals of the same species (and 
species of the same genus) are the same. However, it needs a different meaning of ‘the same’ 
to the problematic one of material essence realism. It says that they are the same not 
essentially, but indifferently (non essentialiter, sed indifferenter). Individuals of the same 
species (and species of the same genus) are the same because they do not differ in, or, in 
positive terms, are similar in being a certain something.48 Identity by indifference attempts at 
providing unity while maintaining distinction. As noted above, individual things are discrete 
from one another in both matter and forms according to the individuum-theory. Consequently, 
there is a sense in which there are as many species as individuals, since each individual is a 
species and is essentially distinct from any other individual. However, all individuals of a 
certain species are the same indifferently. Inasmuch as they are the same indifferently, they 
should be counted as one.49 
Lists of various meanings of ‘the same’ (and corresponding meanings of ‘different’) are 
found in several twelfth-century texts from Abelard’s school. The Abelardian Logica 
‘Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum’ and Glossae secundum vocales and Abelard’s own Theologia 
‘Summi Boni’, Theologia Christiana and Theologia ‘Scholarium’ all include such a list, and 
two meanings of identity are also mentioned in the Sententiae secundum magistrum Petrum 
of Abelard’s school.50 Abelard’s or Abelardian lists all mention “the same by likeness”.51 
Still, the meaning of identity by indifference might have originated in the realist camp. 
Abelard’s Historia Calamitatum tells us that, as a result of Abelard’s criticisms, William of 
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Champeaux abandoned material essence realism and adopted a new meaning of ‘the same’ – 
the same by indifference.52 A sentence attributed to William also puts forward the distinction 
between the same according to the identity of the same essence (secundum identitatem 
eiusdem prorsus essentiae) and the same according to indifference (secundum 
indifferentiam).53 
  3.2. Status and Attentio  
The individuum-theory claims that, in his forms and matter, Socrates is different from 
anything else in the world — he is the same essentially as nothing but himself. He is, 
however, the same indifferently as other things in being a certain something. For example, he 
is the same indifferently as every other man in that he is a man and the same indifferently as 
every other animal in that he is an animal. Insofar as an individual is a certain x (with ‘x’ 
referring either to that very individual or to the species or genus to which that individual 
belongs), that individual is said to be in the status of x.54 Socrates, for instance, can be said to 
be in the status of Socrates, of man, of animal, of body, etc. Any individual thus has a 
number of status, one for being that individual and one for every species and genus above 
that individual in Porphyry’s tree.55 
Every status of a given thing corresponds to an attentio of the subject who knows this 
thing. An attentio is an act of the intellect, by which the thing is considered. According to the 
individuum-theory, an act of attentio does not belie the way things are; it may, however, 
consider only certain aspects of the thing and neglect others. If someone considers (attendat) 
Socrates in the status of Socrates (i.e. inasmuch as he is Socrates) he or she will find him 
different from all other things in the world. In the status of Socrates, Socrates is an 
individual, correctly identified by the proper name ‘Socrates’ which marks him out as 
different from anything else. To consider Socrates in the status of Socrates means to take into 
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account all of Socrates’ properties (i.e. his socratitas). Another attentio, however, might 
consider Socrates only insofar as he has certain properties — for instance, insofar as he is a 
rational mortal animal. Such attentio neglects properties that Socrates possesses as an 
individual but nonetheless it still considers him in a status he truly possesses. In the status of 
man, Socrates is a species and the same (indifferently) with all other individual men, but still 
essentially different from every other thing. ‘Quoniam de generali’ insists that nobody’s 
attentio can change the way things are.56 Moreover, Socrates in statu Socratis is an 
individual; in statu hominis, a species; and in statu animalis, a genus. It does not follow that 
the thing is, in itself, some kind of neutral entity, indifferent to singularity or universality. 
The status in which the thing is individual should be regarded as primary because the thing is 
considered with all its properties in that status. 
Status and attentio are key notions in Abelard’s discussion of universals and of 
understandings in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ and De intellectibus. The purpose that they 
fulfil for Abelard, however, is quite different to their purpose within the individuum-theory. 
When referring to status Abelard’s purpose is to explain the nominatio of universal words, 
that is, approximately, their reference. Universal words (e.g. ‘man’) and proper nouns (e.g. 
‘Socrates’) both name individual things (e.g. Socrates). Proper nouns name individual things 
according to their being discrete from all other things. Universal words, in contrast, name 
singular things in that they agree (with one another) in a certain status, for instance, the status 
hominis, being a man. Abelard insists that such a status, in which things agree and which is 
the cause of the imposition of universal names to singular things, is not itself a thing.57 
Questions have been raised about Abelardian status, particularly on the matter of their 
relationship to dicta and divine ideas.58 Even if they are not things, status seem to be 
extramental. Scholars have wondered whether, while claiming that status are not things (and 
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having strict requirements for what counts as a thing), Abelard is committing himself to 
something that would count as a thing according to contemporary use of the word.59 
Two differences can be identified between Abelard and the individuum-theory in their 
accounts of status. (i) Abelard claims that status are not things,60 whereas P17 calls status 
“either the things constituted from matter and forms, or the affections, that is, constitutions, 
that are in constituted things, or the parts that constitute the things themselves.”61 However, 
there is further evidence to suggest that the picture is more complex than this. In point of fact, 
‘Quoniam de generali’ never claims that status are things. There is also no justification for 
saying (as is sometimes found in secondary literature) that, being a form of realism, the 
individuum-theory claims status to be things.62 The individuum-theory grounds its realism on 
individual things, not on status. From its claim that universals are things, we cannot infer that 
status are things, because the theory does not hold universals to be status; rather, it holds 
universals to be the individual things. On the other hand, Abelard also tells us that one can 
call status “the things themselves set up (statutas) in the nature of man, the common likeness 
of which the person who imposed the word conceived.”63 This is a controversial statement, 
based on Bernhard Geyer’s correction of the manuscript text and has prompted various 
interpretations.64 Most recently, John Marenbon suggested that “the things themselves” 
mentioned here might be particular differences.65 Still, Abelard seemingly accepts calling 
certain things status at this point. (ii) A second difference is that an Abelardian status is that 
in which various individuals come together; the individuum-theory, in contrast, identifies 
various status for each individual. There are status in which an individual is not different 
from other individuals, but also a status (marking that individual as individual) in which that 
individual is different from others. However here, too, there are similarities. The account of 
the individuum-theory in LNPS, for instance, speaks of status as that “in the participation of 
which many things come together” or “do not come together.”66 
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Attentio/attendere are mentioned in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ and in De intellectibus in 
conjunction with intellectus, ‘understanding.’67 An understanding is an act of the soul that 
consists of considering (attendere) something, or paying attention (attentio) to something.68 
An understanding is therefore not identical to the attentio (or, as we shall see, to the several 
attentiones) involved in it. Understandings ought to be distinguished further from the 
content/object of that act,69 as well as from sense, imagination, estimation, knowledge and 
reason.70 As highlighted by Chris Martin, any understanding involves two aspects.71 (i) On 
the one hand, it needs an object extrinsic to the act. When things are perceived by the senses, 
the attentio is directed to the things themselves. When things are not perceived by the senses 
(because what I am considering is sensible but not being perceived by my senses at that time, 
or because what I am considering is not a sensible thing at all) the attentio is directed to 
mental images.72 (ii) On the other hand, understandings have an “adverbial component,” that 
is to say, they consider the object in a particular way (modus). It is possible to consider the 
same thing in different ways through different attentiones. In each case a different 
understanding is produced. For instance, a piece of wood can be considered inasmuch as it is 
a piece of wood, inasmuch as it is a body or inasmuch as it is an oak tree or a fig tree. 
Different attentiones will result in different understandings (“diuersae attentiones uariant 
intellectus”).73  
The individuum-theory only considers attentio paid to individuals in their status of being 
individuals, or to individuals in other status that they possess.74 Abelard’s use of attentio is 
much wider. We can pay attention to things that do not exist. We have, for instance, an 
understanding of past time, future time and of imaginary entities such as chimeras.75 
Understandings can be combined into composite understandings. In such cases, more than 
one attentio is involved, one for each element that has been joined and one for their joining. 
To give an example, the understanding of a laughing stone is a composite understanding. It 
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involves three attentiones: one for the stone, one for the property of laughing and one for 
their joining.76 (As these examples show, the understanding need not be sound: it can be an 
empty understanding whereby properties that are not joined in reality have been joined.)77 
Moreover, understandings (acts involving attentiones towards an object) can be formed as the 
result of hearing words. For a word or a group of words to signify means precisely to produce 
an understanding in the hearer’s mind. Attentio towards something can be gained as the result 
of hearing a vox significativa, a meaningful word. But attentio can also be gained as the result 
of hearing a syncategorematic term with words with which it co-signifies,78 or simply by the 
conjoining of voces significativae according to grammatical rules, as in ‘laughing stone.’ All 
such attentiones contribute to the composite understanding produced by hearing that string of 
words.  
  3.3. Neutralizing Opposite Predicates, or How to Predicate Opposite 
Predicates of One and the Same Thing  
Even if one grants that identity by indifference and status/attentio could work for the 
individuum-theory, many problems remain. According to Porphyry and Aristotle, opposite 
definitions apply to individuals and universals. The crucial element for their difference is 
“being predicated of many.” A universal is predicated of many: the individual is not (the 
individual is predicated of one only).79 
The individuum-theory, therefore, faces a double obstacle. The first obstacle is how the 
definition of genus or species, which is meant to differentiate a genus or a species from an 
individual, can be applied to an individual thing. The second obstacle is how this definition 
can be applied to an individual thing. Such definitions clearly stem from the predicative 
approach to universals. It is difficult to claim that a thing (let alone an individual thing) is 
predicated of many since things themselves are not “predicated.”80  
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Realists, however, have a strategy for dealing with the latter obstacle. The predicate 
‘predicated of many,’ they say, must undergo “ontological interpretation.”81 “Socrates (in 
statu x) is predicated of many” merely means, they say, that he is similar to many in being a 
certain x, or that he converges with many in being a certain x.82  
The main obstacle, therefore, is the first one — applying the definition of universal (as that 
which is predicated of many) to an individual. Opposite properties would be predicated of 
that individual. Saying that Socrates is a universal means that Socrates is both predicated of 
many/agrees with many (as a universal) and is not predicated of many/does not agree with 
many (as an individual). How can opposite predicates be true of one and the same thing? Two 
main strategies can be envisioned for dealing with this. One is to find a way for truly 
predicating opposite predicates of one and the same thing. Another is to claim that what seem 
to be opposite predicates are not, in fact, opposite — that is, to neutralize their opposition. 
This latter strategy is endorsed by the individuum-theory using some Abelardian tools. And 
the first strategy was also tried by Abelard, as we shall see: 
1. In brief, the strategy of the individuum-theory for dealing with opposite predicates 
predicated of one and the same thing is to introduce status into such predicates.83 We have 
seen that, according to this theory, it is true that “Socrates is a genus” and “Socrates is 
predicated of many.” However, one needs to be careful with such formulations. In order for 
them to be true, ‘Socrates’ must not refer to Socrates in statu Socratis, that is, Socrates 
inasmuch as he is an individual. If ‘is predicated of many’ is predicated of Socrates truly, 
then we must be considering Socrates in a species-related or genus-related state, for instance, 
in statu animalis. Predicates, in other words, are attributed to Socrates according to certain 
status he has, not others (and not any status). Thus, the proper status has to be identified in 
the subject when we predicate predicates such as ‘is predicated of many,’ in order to 
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determine whether the sentence is true (as in: Socrates according to animal-state is predicated 
of many) or false (as in: Socrates according to Socrates-state is predicated of many).  
The theory, however, moves a step further. When we make an ontological translation of 
certain predicates, such as ‘predicated of many,’84 the status according to which the subject is 
taken is, in fact, moved to the predicate. This is clear if the ontological translation of these 
predicates is considered. “Socrates (in statu animalis) is predicated of many” means that 
“many agree with Socrates in being animal;” “Socrates (in statu Socratis) is not predicated of 
many” means that “many do not agree with Socrates in being Socrates.”85 The predicate, 
‘predicated of many/predicated of one only’, in other words, must be paraphrased differently 
according to the subject term. These predicates are to be regarded as incomplete. They 
contain an empty slot that needs to be filled in, identifying the status in which the subject is 
taken. Such predicates, in other words, act like the so-called Abelardian predicates, that is, 
predicates affected by their subjects.86 Once the status is included for consideration, 
predicates that seemed to be opposite are no longer opposite because they have been 
relativized to different status (‘predicated of many according to the animal-state’, ‘not 
predicated of many according to the Socrates-state’).  
2. Interestingly, Abelard also tried the first strategy. 87 The problem of predicating 
opposite predicates of the same subject arises for things that are essentially the same, but 
different in property.88 An example of such things is a statue and the stone from which it is 
made (another example is the physical aspect of a word, vox, and the word inasmuch as it 
signifies something, sermo).89 A statue and the stone that makes it are, Abelard says, the 
same in essence, with ‘essentia’ here meaning “thing.”90 A statue and its stone are, in other 
words, one and the same thing. They are not, however, the same in property, because they 
fail to be the same in all their properties. There are properties that can be truly predicated of 
the statue, but not of the stone, and vice versa. For instance, only the statue is made material 
17 
 
when it is crafted (passing from the mind of its artisan into a material state): the stone is not 
(it was already material before the statue was crafted).  
If two items, a and b, are the same in essence but not in property, then in one sense we are 
authorized to say that “a is b,” and in another sense we are not authorized to say this. It seems 
that we are authorized to say this because they are the same thing. However, we are not fully 
authorized to say this because, usually, “a is b” means that any property that is truly 
predicated of b is also truly predicated of a — and, as the examples show, this is not the case 
here. So should we or should we not say that a is b? 
Abelard replies that when a and b are essentially the same, but different in property we 
should say that a is that which is b, but not that a is b.  
Abelard’s solution has two aspects. First, he shows that in the proposition “a is b” there is, 
in fact, a double predication: an essential predication of b with respect to a, and an adjacent 
predication of the properties of b with respect to a. Essential predication means that (if the 
proposition is true) the thing denoted by a is identical to the thing denoted by b. For instance, 
in the proposition “Socrates is white,” the essential predication says that “Socrates is 
(identical to) the white thing.” Adjacent predication, on the contrary, means that the property 
of b inheres in a. In the proposition “Socrates is white,” the adjacent predication says that 
whiteness inheres in Socrates.91 In the cases of the statue and its stone, however, only the 
essential predication between a and b is true, whereas the adjacent predication of the 
properties of b with respect to a is not. Therefore (and this is his second step), Abelard 
suggests using an expression such as “a is that which is b,” which, in his eyes, indicates only 
the essential predication between a and b and involves no adjacent predication of b with 
respect to a.92 
This is a powerful way of attributing different (even opposite) properties to two items, a 
and b, while also saying that they are essentially the same. In other words, it could represent a 
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different way of tackling the problem of the individuum-theory. Supporters of this view could 
say that “the individual is the universal” should rightly be understood as “the individual is 
that which is the universal.” Opposite properties could then be predicated of each of them: 
‘predicated of many’ could be truly said of the universal, and ‘not predicated of many’ of the 
individual.93 But instead of attributing opposite predicates to two items that are (only) 
essentially the same, the opposite strategy is deployed, that is, to neutralize the predicates’ 
opposition. Both ‘predicated of many’ and ‘not predicated of many’ are truly said of 
Socrates/the individual/this thing with no contradiction, because what we are predicating is, 
in fact, ‘predicated of many according to animal-state’ and ‘not predicated of many according 
to Socrates-state,’ which are not opposite predicates. Applying the essential-only-predication 
strategy would mean that universals and individuals are two distinct entities somehow unified 
in one existing thing. The individuum-theory takes the opposite direction. It wants to claim 
that universals and individuals are not distinct entities at all, and that the definition of a 
universal can truly be applied to the individual thing. 
CONCLUSION 
In the twelfth century, a form of realism was endorsed trying to incorporate elements 
palatable to nominalists. I have called such realism “individuum-theory” and tried to list such 
elements. They include criticising material essence realism, endorsing that individuals only 
exist, introducing a new sort of identity, positing status and attentiones, and finding strategies 
for neutralising opposite predicates. Many elements characterising such realism are also 
found in Abelard to serve the opposite aim of developing a non-realist account of universals. 
Was the individuum-theory a successful position? According to John of Salisbury the view 
was quickly abandoned.94 All in all, the position seems at best problematic, at worst 
paradoxical. If contemporary criteria of explanatory power and of parsimony are used to 
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assess it, the individuum-theory does not seem to score well. Indifferentia performs a job that, 
in other accounts, is done by common universals: explaining similarity among things. One 
could argue, however, that its explanatory power is little and the problem is simply pushed 
one step further. Status raise doubts with respect to parsimony. One may wonder whether, by 
admitting status, one is committing to other things in addition to individual things. Abelard, 
for instance, argues against the individuum-theory that, if individual things come together in 
man and each man is either this or that man, individuals things come together in this or that 
individual man. But this cannot be true because any individual, as individual, is different 
from other things rather than agreeing with them.95 Such argument challenges status by 
interpreting the coming together of things as coming together in some thing. It also raises an 
additional point of criticism. It challenges the idea that opposite predicates really apply to one 
and the same thing, as is required by claiming that individuals are universals. Even if some 
predicates can be neutralised to different status, problems remain with respect to other 
properties since individuals and universals ultimately have to do entirely different jobs 
(explaining the fact of being distinct and explaining the fact of being either similar or 
common).96 Twelfth-century arguments challenging the individuum-theory do not usually 
share contemporary criteria for assessing positions. The theory is judged weak primarily 
because it struggles to explain authoritative texts in a plausible way.97 Still, the individuum-
theory remains interesting. Among other things, in the Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ commentary 
on Isagoge Abelard goes back to criticising this view frequently;98 and similarities between 
the individuum-theory and later views on universals have also been noted.99 
* Caterina Tarlazzi is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Cambridge and a Research 
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1 See Marenbon, The Philosophy, 104, 117. I am grateful to John Marenbon, Wojciech Wciórka, and 
conference audiences in Cambridge, London and Warsaw for kindly commenting on early drafts, and to 
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anonymous referees for JHP for their helpful criticism. I also acknowledge Yukio Iwakuma for sharing his 
unpublished transcriptions of P17, and Peter King and Chris Martin for sharing their unpublished work towards 
critical editions of the Logica ‘Nostrum Petitioni Sociorum’ and Glossae secundum vocales. 
2 See Gracia, “Approaches” and, for details of the twelfth-century curriculum, Marenbon, “Synthesis,” 182–
187.  
3 See Erismann, “Penser le commun.” The contrast esse in multis vs dici de multis might not have been 
regarded as unproblematically overlapping with the contrast res vs voces in this period — even Abelard accepts 
that, in principle, authorities might be talking about predicating things, and indeed the ancient sources do 
sometimes talk of predication in a way that is not simply linguistic. 
4 This label has no previous tradition, and the theory has been given a variety of names: ‘identity theory,’ 
‘status-theory,’ ‘indifference theory,’ etc.  
5 See Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 116–127; King, Peter Abailard, 174–181, 215–234. 
6 See Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” focusing on the strategy for neutralising opposite predicates, and 
Pinzani, “Identità parziale,” on identity according to the individuum-theory. 
7 See especially Erismann, L’Homme commun. 
8 LI 10.17–11.9 (Abelard’s description of material essence realism): “Quidam enim ita rem uniuersalem 
accipiunt, ut in rebus diuersis ab inuicem per formas eandem essentialiter substantiam collocent, quae 
singularium, in quibus est, materialis sit essentia et, in se ipsa una, tantum per formas inferiorum sit diuersa. 
Quas quidem formas si separari contingeret, nulla penitus differentia rerum esset, quae formarum tantum 
diuersitate ab inuicem distant, cum sit penitus eadem essentialiter materia. Verbi gratia in singulis hominibus 
numero differentibus eadem est hominis substantia, quae hic Plato per haec accidentia fit, ibi Socrates per illa. 
Quibus quidem Porphyrius assentire maxime uidetur, cum ait: ‘Participatione speciei plures homines unus, in 
particularibus autem unus et communis plures.’ Et rursus: ‘Indiuidua, inquit, dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam 
unumquodque eorum consistit ex proprietatibus, quarum collectio non est in alio.’ Similiter et in singulis 
animalibus specie differentibus unam et eandem essentialiter animalis substantiam ponunt, quam per diuersarum 
differentiarum susceptionem in diuersas species trahunt, ueluti si ex hac cera modo statuam hominis, modo 
bouis faciam diuersas eidem penitus essentiae manenti formas aptando. Hoc tamen refert quod eodem tempore 
cera eadem statuas non constituit, sicut in uniuersali conceditur, quod scilicet uniuersale ita commune Boethius 
dicit, ut eodem tempore idem totum sit in diuersis quorum substantiam materialiter constituat, et cum in se sit 
uniuersale, idem per aduenientes formas singulare sit, sine quibus naturaliter in se subsistit et absque eis 
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nullatenus actualiter permanet, uniuersale quidem in natura, singulare uero actu et incorporeum quidem et 
insensibile in simplicitate uniuersalitatis suae intelligitur, corporeum uero atque sensibile idem per accidentia in 
actu subsistit et eadem teste Boethio et subsistunt singularia et intelliguntur uniuersalia.” See also LI 63.31–
65.11, 125.3–126.7; LNPS 515.14–31 (quoted below, n. 41); HC §6 (quoted below, n. 52); GS §33; QG §§2–3; 
P17, ff. 123va, 125va (quoted below, n. 43); Erismann, “Generalis essentia,” 32–37; Brumberg, “Universaux,” 
429–439; Tarlazzi, “Iam corpus,” 3–6. The label ‘material essence realism,’ based on LI 10.19, is introduced by 
Tweedale, Abailard on Universals. 
9 See Galluzzo, Breve storia, 84–85.  
10 See Gracia, Introduction, 198–204. Considering accidents as the principle of individuation of the 
substance possessing them is one of the tenets of the Standard Theory of Individuality of the high Middle Ages 
(125–129).  
11 It is not doubtful whether an individual has one material component only (the last species) on this account, 
or one material component for each species and each genus located above that individual in Porphyry’s tree. The 
twelfth-century way of considering universal things as matter, moreover, is quite idiosyncratic (but cf. for 
sources Porphyrius, isag., 18.9–15, 23.15–16; Boethius, div., 14.5–7, 16.12–14). Matter is that which is 
common to different individuals of the same species, or to different species of the same genus. 
12 See Erismann, “Penser le commun,” 382 and Id., “Immanent realism,” 218–220.  
13 Boethius, II Comm. In Isag., 162.15–163.3: “quodsi unum quiddam numero genus est, commune 
multorum esse non poterit. una enim res si communis est, aut partibus communis est et non iam tota communis, 
sed partes eius propriae singulorum, aut in usus habentium etiam per tempora transit, ut sit commune ut seruus 
communis uel equus, aut uno tempore omnibus commune fit, non tamen ut eorum quibus commune est, 
substantiam constituat, ut est theatrum uel spectaculum aliquod, quod spectantibus omnibus commune est. genus 
uero secundum nullum horum modum commune esse speciebus potest; nam ita commune esse debet, ut et totum 
sit in singulis et uno tempore et eorum quorum commune est, constituere ualeat et formare substantiam” (cf. LI 
11.1–2, quoted above, n. 8).  
14 See Erismann, L’Homme commun, 89–112; Id., “Immanent Realism,” 215, 217, 229. 
15 See Erismann, “Immanent Realism,” 227–229; Id., “Penser le commun,” 385.  
16 See LI 13.5–17; Gracia, Introduction, 207–209; Brumberg, “Substrat.” 
17 See LI 11.10–12.26; LNPS 517.25–41; GS §§35–44; QG §§12–13. 
18 See GS §34; QG §§9–10, 14. 
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19 I am grateful to John Marenbon for pointing this out to me. Abelard, for instance, says that universal 
entities are repugnant to the physica in LI 11.10–11.  
20 LI 13.18–14.6, 14.18–31, 15.23–16.18, are the crucial passages (see also Lafleur–Carrier, “Édition” for a 
revised edition). Abelard also goes back to criticising the individuum-theory in LI 37.3–29, 46.24–47.15, 
100.13–20. 
21 LNPS 518.9–521.20. For reasons to consider LNPS Abelardian rather than Abelard’s, see Marenbon, 
Abelard in Four Dimensions, 33–38.  
22 GS §§50–73 (description and criticism of the individuum-theory), §§87–89 (the treatise’s own position). 
23 QG, and Romano, Una soluzione, for another edition.  
24 MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 3237, ff. 123ra–124va (first, incomplete version of the 
commentary) and 125ra–130rb (second, complete version) (= P17, as listed in the working catalogue of twelfth-
century logical commentaries in Marenbon, “Medieval Latin Commentaries”). P17 has an ambiguous position 
with regard to the individuum-theory. On the one hand, it introduces the theory as the view “of other people” 
(presumably, therefore, not the author himself: see below, n. 28). On the other hand, it goes on to put forward 
counter-objections against each objection to the individuum-theory. 
25 Ioannes Saresberiensis, Met., 81.18–83.107; Id., Pol., II, 141.25–142.8. For comments on John’s lists, see 
Iwakuma, “Influence,” 313–314; Tursi, “Nueve tesis;” Pinzani, “Giovanni di Salisbury.” 
26 Compare LI 13.18–33 (quoted below, n. 27) and LI 64.20–65.11. 
27 LI 13.18–33: “Vnde alii aliter de uniuersalitate sentientes magisque ad sententiam rei accedentes dicunt res 
singulas non solum formis ab inuicem esse diuersas, uerum personaliter in suis essentiis esse discretas nec ullo 
modo id quod in una est, esse in alia, siue illud materia sit siue forma, nec eas formis quoque remotis minus in 
essentiis suis discretas posse subsistere, quia earum discretio personalis, secundum quam scilicet haec non est 
illa, non per formas fit, sed est per ipsam essentiae diuersitatem, sicut et formae ipsae in se ipsis diuersae sunt 
inuicem, alioquin formarum diuersitas in infinitatem procederet, ut alias ad aliarum diuersitatem necesse esset 
supponi. Talem differentiam Porphyrius notauit inter generalissimum et specialissimum dicens: ‘Amplius neque 
species fieret unquam generalissimum neque genus specialissimum,’ ac si diceret: haec est earum differentia 
quod huius non est illius essentia. Sic et praedicamentorum discretio consistit non per formas aliquas, quae eam 
faciant, sed per propriae diuersificationem essentiae.” LNPS 518.21–24: “Dicunt enim singulas substantias ita in 
propriae suae essentiae discretione diuersas esse, ut nullo modo haec substantia sit eadem cum illa, etiamsi 
substantiae materia penitus formis careret.” See Gracia, Introduction, 210–215.  
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28 QG §26: “Est autem primum propositum sententiae nostrae: Quicquid est, indiuiduum; quod ex ipso rerum 
effectu omnibus rei ueritatem intuentibus manifeste iudicatur.” P17, MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, ff.123vb, 125va: 
“Nunc ad sententiam aliorum accedamus, qui similiter ut praedicti genera et species in utrisque, id est in rebus et 
in uocibus, constituunt. Quorum sententiae positio est nullum uniuersale materiam esse diuersorum; sed sicut 
unum indiuiduum nequit esse aliud, ita materiae eorum idem esse nequeunt. Itaque materiae et species et genera 
diuersorum sic essentialiter inter se discretae sunt sicut indiuidua, ut uerum sit dicere tot genera tot species esse 
in numero quot sunt indiuidua. Nec aliquod uniuersale commune uel praedicabile de pluribus est ita quod 
essentialiter pluribus insit. Sed commune appellatur idcirco quod, cum ipsum uniuersale in uno sit indiuiduo, 
aliud ei simillimum in materia et forma est in alio, ut uox dicitur communis non quod eadem uox essentialiter 
ueniat ad diuersos, sed consimilis. Praedicabile autem de pluribus dicitur, non ideo quod conueniat essentialiter 
pluribus, sed quia ipsum est materia unius et suum indifferens uel est uel esse potest materia alterius. Nec ideo 
eadem species diuersorum esse dicitur quod essentialiter sit eadem, sed quia sunt consimiles. Illas autem species 
diuersorum similes et indifferentes esse dico, quae cum discretae sint, tamen ex materiis et formis consimiles 
effectus exigentibus componuntur, ut homo Socratis et homo Platonis, cum essentialiter differant, tamen 
materiae et formae eorum consimiles effectus operantur. Asinus uero et lapis diuersae species et in essentia et 
secundum indifferentiam sunt, cum dissimiles status habeant et effectus dissimiles exigant. Status autem appello 
uel res ex materia et formis constitutas uel passiones, id est constitutiones quae in rebus sunt constitutis, uel 
partes quae ipsas res constituunt. Affirmat quoque haec sententia genus et speciem et indiuiduum sic esse idem 
prorsus, ut uere possit dici ‘Socrates indiuiduum est homo species et animal genus’ et e conuerso; et ‘singulare 
est uniuersale,’ et e conuerso, quod Boethius confirmat, ubi sic dicit uniuersalitatem et singularitatem esse in 
eodem fundamento, sicut cauitas et curuitas licet diuersa sint tamen in eadem sunt linea.” 
29 GS §50: “Nunc itaque illam quae de indifferentia est sententiam perquiramus cuius haec est positio: Nihil 
omnino est praeter indiuiduum sed et illud aliter et aliter attentum species et genus et generalissimum est. Itaque 
Socrates in ea natura in qua subiectus est sensibus, scilicet secundum illam naturam quam significat de eo 
‘Socrates,’ indiuiduum est, ideo quia tale est proprietas eius numquam tota reperitur in alio. Est enim alter homo 
sed Socratitatem nullus habet praeter Socratem. De eodem Socrate quandoque habetur intellectus non 
concipiens quicquid notat haec uox ‘Socrates,’ sed Socratitatis oblitus id tantum perspicit de Socrate quod notat 
inde ‘homo,’ idest animal rationale mortale, et secundum hanc attentionem species est, est enim praedicabilis de 
pluribus in quid de eodem statu. Si intellectus postponat rationalitatem et mortalitatem et id tantum sibi subiciat 
quod notat haec uox ‘animal,’ in hoc statu genus est. Quod si relictis omnibus formis in hoc tantum 
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consideremus Socratem quod notat inde ‘substantia,’ generalissimum est. Idem de Platone dicas per omnia. 
Quod si quis dicat proprietatem Socratis in eo quod est homo non magis esse in pluribus quam eiusdem Socratis 
in quantum est Socrates, aeque enim homo qui est Socratis in nullo alio est nisi in Socrate, sicut ipse Socrates, 
uerum quidem concedunt, ita tamen determinandum putant: Socrates in quantum est Socrates nullum prorsus 
indifferens habet quod in alio inueniatur sed in quantum est homo plura habet indifferentia quae in Platone et 
aliis inueniuntur. Nam et Plato similiter homo est ut Socrates, quamuis non sit idem homo essentialiter qui est 
Socrates. Idem de animali et substantia.” 
30 Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 60: “These things are to be considered as ‘ordinary’ individual 
objects acceptable to an antirealist (in contrast to ‘additional’ particulars such as Platonic Forms understood as 
autonomous paradigms or prototypes).” 
31 QG §26 (immediately following the text quoted on n. 28): “Vnde si genera et species sint — sunt autem, 
quippe materia indiuiduorum sunt — oportet quod indiuidua sint. Sed et ipsa indiuidua sunt et genera et species. 
Est igitur eadem essentia et genus et species [et added by the editor] indiuiduum; ut Socrates est indiuiduum et 
species specialissima et genus subalternum et genus generalissimum.” 
32 LNPS 518.9–10 (quoted below, n. 48). 
33 Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 57. 
34 Aristoteles, int., 7, 17a39–b2: “dico autem uniuersale quod in pluribus natum est praedicari, singulare uero 
quod non, ut homo quidem uniuersale, Plato uero eorum quae sunt singularia.” For our purposes, the distinction 
between what is actually predicated of many and what can be predicated of many can be disregarded; see, 
however, Sirkel, “Alexander of Aphrodisias,” 298–300. 
35 Porphyrius, isag., 2, 17–20: “Eorum enim quae praedicantur alia quidem de uno dicuntur solo, sicut 
indiuidua sicut Socrates et hic et hoc, alia uero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species et differentiae et 
propria, et accidentia communiter sed non proprie alicui.” 
36 Boethius, II Comm. In Isag., I, 11 (166.23–167.7): “neque enim interclusum est ut duae res eodem in 
subiecto sint ratione diuersae, ut linea curua atque caua, quae res cum diuersis definitionibus terminentur 
diuersusque earum intellectus sit, semper tamen in eodem subiecto reperiuntur; eadem enim linea caua, eadem 
curua est. ita quoque generibus et speciebus, idest singularitati et uniuersalitati, unum quidem subiectum est, sed 
alio modo uniuersale est, cum cogitatur, alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his in quibus esse suum habet.” On 
the unique-subject theory, see de Libera, L’Art, 235–244. 
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37 P17 explicitly mentions Boethius’s unique-subject theory to support the individuum-theory: see n. 28. 
Boethius’s passage also supports material essence realism in LI: see n. 8. 
38 See Erismann, L’Homme commun, 38–58, 104–112; Id., “Immanent Realism” and Id., “Un autre 
aristotélisme?” 
39 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for putting things in this manner. 
40 By this I mean that similarities can be detected between Abelard’s views and the individuum-theory with 
regard to terminology and strategies, that is to say, that certain elements are present in both positions. This might 
or might not be the result of borrowing such elements from Abelard and the relationship may vary with respect 
to different elements. In general, however, my interpretation favours the hypothesis of a realist borrowing of at 
least some elements from Abelard. 
41 LNPS 515.14–31: “Nonnulli enim ponunt decem res diuersas esse naturaliter secundum decem 
praedicamentorum uel generalissimorum distinctionem, cum uidelicet ita dicant res esse uniuersales, hoc est 
naturaliter communicabiles pluribus, quod eandem rem essentialiter in pluribus ita ponunt ut eadem quae est in 
hac re, essentialiter sit in illa, diuersis tamen formis affecta. Verbi gratia ut animal, natura scilicet substantia 
animata sensibilis, ita est in Socrate et Brunello et in aliis, quod eadem quae est in Socrate et per aduenientes 
formas effecta est Socrates, et essentialiter tota est in Brunello ita quod Socrates nullo modo a Brunello in 
essentia diuersus est sed in formis, cum eadem essentia penitus materialiter aliis formis in isto, aliis formis in 
illo sit occupata. Quibus illud Porphyrii consentire uidetur, scilicet: ‘Participatione speciei plures homines unus, 
unus autem et communis plures.’ Et iuxta hanc sententiam praedicari de pluribus tale est, ac si diceremus: idem 
essentialiter ita inesse aliquibus rebus, per formas oppositas diuersificatis, ut singulis essentialiter uel adiacenter 
conueniat” (my italics). 
42 See Jolivet, “Lexicographie,” 538–543, on ‘essentia’ meaning thing and matter.  
43 P17, ff. 123va, 125va: “Quorundam enim eorum est sententia eandem rem uniuersalem totam indiuisam in 
diuersis et oppositis indiuiduis esse, ut uere dici possit idem animal in essentia est materia Socratis et Brunelli. 
Ponunt etiam genus et quodlibet uniuersale in simplici natura acceptum rei singulari oppositum esse, 
inferioribus uero formis uestitum idem esse cum singulari” (my italics). 
44 Ensis and mucro in the abovementioned example are the same in essence and the same in definition. This 
white item and this hard item are the same in essence but not in definition. See TSB II, 83–84 (142.751–
143.783), and below, n. 50.  
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45 See Marenbon, Abelard in Four Dimensions, 195. If it is characterised in this way, sameness in essence 
can be differentiated from sameness in number. According to Abelard the part of a thing is the same in number 
as the thing it belongs to, but not the same in essence: see TSB II, 83 (143.759–778). In later accounts Abelard 
says that the part is not the same in number as its whole nor different in number from it: see TChr III, 148–153 
(250.1807–252.1874). Therefore, things that are the same in number are not always also the same in essence. On 
the other hand, things that are the same in essence are always the same in number. However, they can differ in 
definition (see above, n. 44) and in property (see below). 
46 See especially QG §§2–3 and Brumberg, “Universaux,” 429–439.  
47 As acknowledged in criticism against material essence realism noting that, following this view, only ten 
things exist, one per category. See especially LI 12.27–41. 
48 LI 13.33–14.6: “Cum autem omnes res ita diuersas ab inuicem esse uelint, ut nulla earum cum alia uel 
eandem essentialiter materiam uel eandem essentialiter formam participet, uniuersale tamen rerum adhuc 
retinentes idem non essentialiter quidem, sed indifferenter ea quae discreta sunt, appellant, ueluti singulos 
homines in se ipsis discretos idem esse in homine dicunt, id est non differre in natura humanitatis, et eosdem 
quos singulares dicunt secundum discretionem, uniuersalem dicunt secundum indifferentiam et similitudinis 
conuenientiam.” LNPS 518.9–13: “Sunt alii in rebus uniuersalitatem assignantes, qui eandem rem uniuersalem 
et particularem esse astruunt. Hi namque eandem rem in diuersis indifferenter, non essentialiter inferioribus 
affirmant. Veluti cum dicunt idem esse in Socrate et Platone, ‘idem’ pro indifferenti, idest consimili, 
intelligunt.” QG §30: “Et attende quod Socrates et unumquodque indiuiduum hominis, in eo quod unumquodque 
est animal rationale mortale, sunt unum et idem; non dico idem essentialiter, quia et secundum hunc statum et 
secundum quemlibet adeo opposita sunt in esse suo quod nullum eorum est aliquid aliorum nec etiam esse 
potest; sed sunt idem, idest indifferentes, secundum statum hominis. Ecce Socrates: secundum statum hominis 
est species specialissima, quia secundum hunc statum cum indiuiduo hominis tantum conuenit. Item, ipse 
Socrates secundum statum animalis est genus et species, quippe animal est genus hominis et species corporis. 
Item, Socrates secundum statum substantiae est genus generalissimum” (my italics).  
49 GS §§51–53: “Huic sententiae aeque auctoritas et ratio contradicunt. Et primum quibus auctoritatibus 
contraria sit uideamus. Porphyrius dicit: ‘Decem quidem generalissima, specialissima in numero quodam non 
tamen indefinito, indiuidua uero infinita sunt.’ Positio uero huius sententiae hoc habet: Singula indiuidua 
substantiae in quantum sunt substantia generalissima esse. Itaque non potius indiuidua infinita sunt quam 
generalissima. Soluunt tamen illi dicentes: Generalissima quidem infinita esse essentialiter sed per 
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indifferentiam decem tantum, quot enim indiuidua substantiae tot etiam sunt generalissimae substantiae. Omnia 
tamen illa generalissima generalissimum unum dicuntur quia indifferentia sunt. Socrates enim in eo quod est 
substantia indifferens est cum qualibet substantia in eo statu quod substantia est” (my italics). LI 14.22–27: “Qui 
tot species quot indiuidua quantum ad rerum numerum ponunt et totidem genera, quantum uero ad 
similitudinem naturarum pauciorem numerum uniuersalium quam singularium assignant. Quippe omnes 
homines et in se multi sunt per personalem discretionem et unum per humanitatis similitudinem et iidem a se 
ipsis diuersi quantum ad discretionem et ad similitudinem iudicantur.” P17, ff. 123vb, 125va–b: “Praedictae 
sententiae opponitur sic. Dicit Aristoteles decem esse generalissima, indiuidua uero infinita esse; sed cum 
superius positum sit tot esse genera quot sunt indiuidua, tunc necesse erit similiter esse generalissima infinita. 
Solutio. Non dixit Aristoteles omnia generalissima esse decem tantum in essentia, sed manerias eorum, id est 
collectiones, decem appellauit. Vel omnia generalissima substantiae secundum similitudinem et uisum hominum 
unum esse reputauit, sicut plura nomina multiuoca pro eadem significatione solent unum appellari. Vel sic 
intellexit: decem sunt, id est apta sunt in suprema natura decem scilicet intellectibus concipi, cum indiuidua 
discrete concipi nequeant nisi innumeris intellectibus. Vel illud de uocibus generalissimis dictum fuit.” As we 
have seen above (n. 11) it is customary to say that the species is the matter of the individual. Thus the 
individuum-theory claims that the individual Plato, inasmuch as he is the species Man, is the matter of himself 
essentially, and of each other individual man indifferently: see QG §§31, 37; P17, ff. 124ra–b, 126ra. 
50 LNPS 558.11–560.15, GSV 178–179 and TSB II, 82–102 (142.745–150.959) mention the same six 
meanings of ‘the same’ (and corresponding meanings of ‘different’): the same in essence, in number, by 
definition, by likeness, unchanging, and by effect. In TChr III, 138–162 (247.1677–255.1975), the same in 
property is added, and the list now amounts to five: the same in essence or in number, in property, by definition, 
by likeness, and unchanging. Finally, in TSch II, 95–100 (454.1411–456.1487) three meanings of ‘the same’ are 
mentioned (by likeness, in essence or number, and by definition or property) and three of ‘different’ (in essence, 
in number, by definition or property). SP 115–117, distinguishes between identitas personae (additionally said 
to be personaliter et quasi discrete) and identitas naturae (indifferenter ac simpliciter); see Jolivet, “Trois 
variations,” 138–139. Boethius also distinguishes three meanings of ‘the same’ – numerically the same, the 
same in specie, and the same in genus: II Comm. In Isag., 191.21–192.19, 240.14–243.27; trin., 167.46–168.63. 
See Jolivet, Arts du langage, 285–93; Gracia, Introduction, 227–232; Marenbon, The Philosophy, 150–158; 
Wilks, “Peter Abelard,” 370–373; King, “Metaphysics,” 85–92; J. Brower, “Trinity;” Arlig, Mereology, 165–
197; Marenbon, “Changing Thoughts;” Id., Abelard in Four Dimensions, 183–184, 195–198. 
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51 See TSB II, 86 (144.812–817): “Idem uero similitudine dicuntur quelibet discreta essentialiter, que in 
aliquo inuicem similia sunt, ut species in genere uel indiuidua in specie idem sunt siue unum, uel quelibet in 
aliqua proprietate conuenientia. Vnde Porphyrius: ‘Participatione,’ inquit, ‘speciei plures homines unus; unus 
autem et communis particularibus plures’,” and, with some variation, TChr III, 145 (250.1788–1794); LNPS 
559.30–34; GSV 178. See also TSch II, 95 (454.1413–1415): “Idem similitudine, cum easdem res apud omnes 
esse sicut et intellectus Aristotiles asserit, et nos easdem merces in hac et in illa ciuitate reperiri dicimus.” 
52 HC §6: “Tum ego ad eum reuersus ut ab ipso rethoricam audirem, inter cetera disputationum nostrarum 
conamina antiquam eius de uniuersalibus sententiam patentissimis argumentorum rationibus ipsum commutare, 
immo destruere compuli. Erat autem in ea sententia de communitate uniuersalium, ut eamdem essentialiter rem 
totam simul singulis suis inesse astrueret indiuiduis, quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diuersitas sed sola 
multitudine accidentium uarietas. Sic autem istam tunc suam correxit sententiam, ut deinceps rem eamdem non 
essentialiter sed indifferenter diceret” (my italics). 
53 Sententia 236 of the Liber Pancrisis (in Lottin, Psychologie et morale. V, 190–195), especially 192.112–
193.127: “Et ut omne ambiguitatis genus excludamus, uides has duas uoces ‘unum’ scilicet et ‘idem’ duobus 
accipi modis, secundum indifferentiam et secundum identitatem eiusdem prorsus essentie. Secundum 
indifferentiam, ut Petrum et Paulum idem dicimus esse in hoc quod sunt homines, quantum enim ad 
humanitatem pertinet, sicut iste est rationalis et ille; et sicut iste est mortalis et ille. Sed si ueritatem confiteri 
uolumus, non est eadem utriusque humanitas, sed similis, cum sint duo homines. Sed hic modus unius ad 
naturam diuinitatis non est referendus ne, quod fidei contrarium est, hac acceptione tres Deos uel tres substantias 
cogamur confiteri. Secundum identitatem uero, prorsus unum et idem dicimus Petrum et Simonem, Paulum et 
Saulum, Iacob et Israël qui, cum singuli singulas habeant substantias, singuli non plus quam singulas habent 
personas. Et nos quidem Patrem et Filium hoc modo dicimus idem prorsus in substantia, sed differt quod due 
sunt persone” (my italics). On the Liber Pancrisis, see Giraud - Mews, “Liber” and Giraud, Per verba magistri, 
193–211.  
54 On status in the individuum-theory see LNPS 518.13–27: “Et cum dicunt idem de pluribus praedicari uel 
inesse aliquibus, tale est, ac si aperte diceretur: quaedam in aliqua conuenire natura, idest similia esse ut in eo 
quod corpora sunt uel animalia. Et iuxta hanc, ut diximus, sententiam eandem rem uniuersalem et particularem 
esse concedunt, diuersis tamen respectibus; uniuersalem quidem in eo quod cum pluribus communitatem habet, 
particularem secundum hoc quod a ceteris rebus diuersa est. Dicunt enim singulas substantias ita in propriae 
suae essentiae discretione diuersas esse, ut nullo modo haec substantia sit eadem cum illa, etiamsi substantiae 
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materiae penitus formis careret, quod tale secundum illos praedicari de pluribus, ac si dicatur: aliquis status est, 
participatione cuius multae sunt conuenientes, praedicari de uno solo, ac si dicatur, aliquis status est, 
participatione cuius multae sunt non conuenientes.” P17, MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, ff.123vb, 125va quoted 
above, especially: “Status autem appello uel res ex materia et formis constitutas uel passiones, id est 
constitutiones quae in rebus sunt constitutis, uel partes quae ipsas res constituunt.” See also Wciórka, “Is 
Socrates a Universal?,” 63–68. 
55 Consequently, any status seems to be the extramental and extralinguistic correlate of a proper or common 
noun or of a verb phrase made up of the verb ‘to be’ followed by a proper or common noun. Because of that, 
status do not correspond to contemporary “states of affairs” meant as objective counterparts of propositional 
attitudes. A “state of affair” would rather correspond to Abelard’s dictum, that is, what is said by a proposition. 
See Cesalli, “States of Affairs,” and Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 282–304. 
56 See QG §§27, 29: “Quod qualiter sit, per diuersas attentiones discernitur. Nullam uim tamen faciunt in 
rerum essentia attentiones hominum. Nullius enim attentio confert ipsis rebus uel esse quod non sunt, uel non 
esse quod sunt. Si quis ergo Socratem attendat tamquam Socratem, idest in omni proprietate Socratis, inueniet 
eum cum nullo conuenientem, potius ab omnibus differentem per socratitatem quae in illo solo reperitur et in 
aliis esse non potest, uel eadem uel consimilis, cum nihil sit consimile Socrati secundum statum Socratis; et sic 
Socrates, secundum hunc differentem statum, est indiuiduum. Vnde conuenienter datur sibi hoc uocabulum 
quod est ‘Socrates,’ quod significat eum secundum talem statum. [...] Sed si simpliciter attendatur Socrates non 
ut Socrates, idest non in omni proprietate Socratis, sed in quadam, scilicet in eo quod est animal rationale 
mortale, iam secundum hunc statum est differens et indifferens; differens a qualibet alia re existente, hoc modo 
quo ipse Socrates nec secundum statum hominis nec secundum aliquem alium est essentialiter aliquod aliorum. 
Item, indifferens est, idest consimilis cum quibusdam, scilicet cum Platone et cum aliis indiuiduis hominis, in eo 
quod in unoquoque eorum est animal rationale mortale.” See also GS §50, quoted above, n. 29.  
57 See LI 19.21–20.14, esp. 20.7–14: “Statum autem hominis ipsum esse hominem, quod non est res, 
uocamus, quod etiam diximus communem causam impositionis nominis ad singulos, secundum quod ipsi ad 
inuicem conueniunt. Saepe autem causae nomine ea quoque quae res aliqua non sunt appellamus, ut cum dicitur: 
Verberatus est, quia non uult ad forum. Non uult ad forum, quod ut causa ponitur, nulla est essentia. Statum 
quoque hominis res ipsas in [in is Geyer’s emendation for the MS non] natura hominis statutas possumus 
appellare, quarum communem similitudinem ille concepit, qui uocabulum imposuit.” On the very last sentence, 
see below.  
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58 See LI 22.28–23.4. On Abelard’s status, see especially Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 204–209, 282–
304; Jolivet, “Non-réalisme,” 184–185, 190–191, 194; Marenbon, The Philosophy, 191–201, 207–208; Guilfoy, 
Theory, 52–76; de Libera, L’Art, 373–76; Rosier-Catach, “Priscian on Divine Ideas,” 232–236; Spencer, 
“Status;” Marenbon, “Universals,” 40–41, 44–51. 
59 See Marenbon, “Universals,” 46–47. 
60 See above, n. 57.  
61 Quoted above, n. 54. One possible source is Boethius, top. diff., IV, 7 (79.1–82.17); Stump’s translation, 
83–87.  
62 See for instance Arlig, “Universals,” 1355–1356. 
63 Quoted above, n. 57; translated in Marenbon, “Universals,” 46.  
64 See Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, 207; Jolivet, “Non-réalisme,” 194, n. 2; de Rijk, “Criticisms,” 94–
95; Marenbon, The Philosophy, 192, n. 45; de Libera, L’Art, 374–375; Shimizu, “The Place,” 928–929; Spencer, 
“Status,” 229; Lafleur - Carrier, “Triple signification,” 122–125; Marenbon, “Universals,” 46–48.  
65 Marenbon, “Universals,” 47–48. 
66 See LNPS 518.24–26, quoted above, n. 54.  
67 See LI 25.1–27.34 (cf. also LI 20.20–21.26); LI Per. I, 16–57 (28.82–39.335), 93–123 (51.615–62.866); 
and int.; Marenbon, The Philosophy, 165–173 (highlighting the differences among Abelard’s passages); de 
Libera, L’Art, 384–470; Rosier-Catach, “Discussions,” 15–30 (also pointing to the Augustinian origin of 
attentio); King, “Mental Language;” Martin, “Imposition and Essence,” 187–213; Marenbon, “Universals,” 52–
56.  
68 LI Per. I, 22 (29.104–108): “Praeterea sensus, quem Aristoteles perhibet semper cum sensato in animali 
consistere, quaedam uis est et potentia animae, intellectus uero actio quaedam est. Vnde intelligere dicimus, 
dum aliquid cogitamus;” LI Per. I, 19–20 (29.95–102): “quippe intellectus quasi effectus rationis est. Est autem 
ratio potentia discernendi, id est attendendi et deliberandi apud se aliquid quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate 
consistens, ueluti si quis rem aliquam uel in eo quod est res, uel in eo quod est substantia uel corporea uel 
sensibilis uel colorata penset, uel quasi in aliqua natura uel proprietate excogitet ipsam, etsi ipsa non sit, sicut 
hircoceruus uel dies crastina uel lapis risibilis;” LI Per. I, 49 (37.284–286): “Imaginari itaque est figere animum 
in re, intelligere uero est rem ipsam uel aliquam ipsius naturam uel proprietatem attendere;” int. §6: “At uero 
intellectus esse non potest, nisi ex ratione aliquid iuxta aliquam naturam aut proprietatem attendatur, etiam si sit 
intelligentia cassa;” cf. int. §7. 
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69 See LI 20.28–36. 
70 Understanding (intellectus) is distinguished from sense perception (sensus) in LI 20.20–36; from sense 
perception and imagination (imaginatio), and very briefly reason (ratio), in LI Per. I, 19–24 (28.89–30.132), 
40–53 (34.227–38.312), 61 (40.349–352); from sense perception, imagination, reason, estimation (existimatio) 
and knowledge (scientia) in int. §§1–28. See Gracia, Introduction, 222– 224. 
71 Martin, “Imposition and essence,” 189–193. 
72 See LI 21.18–26 and LI Per. I, 25–35 (30.133–33.196).  
73 LI Per. I, 110 (58.785-794): “Et saepe in eadem imagine diuersae attentiones uariant intellectus, ueluti si 
eam simpliciter ad naturam qualitatis excogitandam instituam uel ad naturam etiam albedinis. Videns enim 
lignum diuersa de eo per rationem attendo, quia modo ipsum in eo quod lignum est excogito, modo in eo 
simpliciter quod corpus, modo in eo quod quercus est uel ficus. Similiter eadem imagine ante mentis oculos 
constituta ipsam et qualitatis et albedinis naturam considero et licet sit eadem imago, plures sunt de ea 
concipiendi modi, modo in eo quod qualitas est, modo in eo quoque quod est album.” 
74 In Abelard’s terminology, these understandings are all “sound,” sani, and “simple,” simplices (however, 
when I consider rational mortal animal rather than man, my understanding is not simple but composite). On 
sound vs empty understandings, see LI Per. I, 73–76 (44.447–45.475), 97 (54.676–683); int. §§56–59; on 
simple vs composite understandings, LI Per. I, 94 (52.621–53.643); int. §§31–45.  
75 See int. §5: “Intellectus uero, hoc est ipsa animi excogitatio, nec corporei exercitio indiget instrumenti quo 
uidelicet ad excogitandum utatur, nec etiam uirtute rei existentis quam excogitetur, cum aeque scilicet et 
existentem et non existentem rem, siue corporalem siue incorporalem, animus sibi per intellectum conficiat, uel 
preteritorum scilicet reminiscendo uel futura prouidendo, uel ea etiam nonnumquam configendo que numquam 
esse contingit, utpote centaurum, chimeram, hircoceruum, sirenes, et alia multa.” Such examples are repeated in 
int. §94 and LI Per. I, 20 (29.101–102, quoted above n. 68). 
76 Abelard’s example is, in fact, homo rudibilis (“man who can bray”), but he also mentions lapis risibilis in 
LI Per. I, 20 (29.102) and lapis rationalis in int. §49. In all these examples, a certain species has been joined 
with the differentia or proprium pertaining to another species; see LI Per. I, 117 (60.827–834): “Volumus 
insuper in ‘homo rudibilis’ quandam intellectus partem ex coniunctione constructionis nasci, qua uidelicet, cum 
et hominem et rudibilitatem attendimus, insuper ea in unam substantiam coniungimus, quae coniunctio cassat 
intellectum. Tres itaque sunt attentiones, duae ad percipienda uera quae ad actiones pertinent, tertia ad 
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coniungenda illa duo in unum, quod adiectiui et substantiui iunctura facit. Ex iunctura itaque totius orationis una 
est attentio quae est tertia pars intellectus.” 
77 Sound and empty understandings are not the same as true and false understandings: LI Per. I, 98 (54.684–
687); int. §§56–60. On attentio with respect to truth and falsity see LI Per. I, 107–108 (57.750–58.777). 
78 See LI Per. I, 118 (60.834–842), with the example of the conjunction ‘if,’ and Rosier-Catach, 
“Discussions,” 23–24.  
79 Cf. above.  
80 However, cf. n. 3 above; Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 62. 
81 Cf. Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 69–73. 
82 LI 14.18–22: “Alii uero sunt qui non solum collectos homines species dicunt, uerum etiam singulos in eo 
quod homines sunt, et cum dicunt rem illam quae Socrates est, praedicari de pluribus, figuratiue accipiunt, ac si 
dicerent: plura cum eo idem esse, idest conuenire, uel ipsum cum pluribus.” LNPS 518.13–27, quoted above, n. 
54. 
83 See Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” on this strategy.  
84 Other examples are: [is] ‘predicated of one only’, [is] ‘an individual/species/genus/universal.’ 
85 QG §§42–43: “Item opponitur. Cum Socrates secundum statum animalis sit genus, praedicatur de 
pluribus, quod est omnis generis; et item, cum Socrates secundum statum Socratis sit indiuiduum, praedicatur de 
uno solo, auctoritate Porphyrii, et ita non praedicatur de multis. Quodsi Socrates praedicatur de multis et non 
praedicatur de multis, uerae sunt duae diuidentes. Quod est impossibile. Solutio. Cum dicimus: ‘Socrates 
secundum statum animalis praedicatur de pluribus,’ haec determinatio, scilicet ‘secundum statum animalis,’ 
refertur ad praedicatum. Et est sensus talis: Plura conueniunt in hoc quod sunt animalia. Cum uero dicimus: 
‘Socrates secundum statum Socratis praedicatur de uno solo,’ illa determinatio ‘secundum statum Socratis’ 
refertur ad praedicatum. Et est sensus: Non est uerum quod plura conueniant in hoc quod sunt Socrates. Et ita 
non sunt diuidentes, et uerum est utrumque, scilicet quod plura sunt animal et quo plura non sunt Socrates.” Ibi, 
§47: “Dicamus ergo: Porphyrius, cum dicat genera differe ab indiuiduis per praedicari de pluribus, nullam ponit 
proprietatem in genere quae non sit in indiuiduo ipsius generis, sed utrimque intendit dare differentiam inter 
genera et indiuidua, in hoc scilicet quod genera praedicantur de pluribus (idest plura conueniunt in generali 
statu), indiuidua non praedicantur de pluribus (idest non est uerum quod plura conueniant in indiuiduali statu).”  
86 See Wciórka, “Is Socrates a Universal?,” 80–87; Noonan, “Indeterminate Identity;” Tweedale, Abailard 
on Universals, 147–157, referring to de Rijk, “Some New Evidence,” 15, for calling them ‘Abelardian.’ 
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87 On all this, see especially Wilks, “Peter Abelard.” See also King, “Metaphysics,” 89–92; Brower, 
“Trinity,” 226–250; Arlig, A Study, 180–194; Marenbon, “Changing Thoughts.” 
88 Difference in definition is said to be the same as difference in property in TSch II, 97 (455.1440–1444). 
However, the two are listed separately in TChr III, 154–158 (252.1875–254.1926) and what follows only 
concerns difference in property. 
89 See especially TChr III, 140–141 (248.1707–1739). It should be noted that the statue/stone example (also 
framed as comparisons with a bronze statue and a waxen image) is simply an example that Abelard uses for 
addressing semantic, Trinitarian and ethical problems (such as the identity of vox and sermo; the identity of the 
Persons of the Trinity; the fact that a punishment is an evil and a good thing at the same time), rather than 
something in which he is directly interested as such. 
90 See above. 
91 See especially dial., 131.23–132.6; LI Per. III, 94–97 (122.684–123.717); de Rijk, LM II.1, 101–108; 
Malcolm, “Reconsideration;” Jacobi, “Investigations;” Wilks, “Peter Abelard,” 366–370; Marenbon, 
“Prédication;” Rosier-Catach, “Verbe substantif.” 
92 See, for instance, TChr IV, 90 (308.1385–309.1394): “Et quemadmodum ibi quod est materia est id quod 
est materiatum ex ea, utpote cera ipsa est cerea imago, uel e conuerso, nec tamen ideo ipsa materia est materiata 
ex se, uel ipsum materiatum est materia sui, ita et hic id quod Pater est id quod est Filius et e conuerso; nec 
tamen Pater est Filius, uel e conuerso. Ibi quippe substantiae praedicatio fit, cum uidelicet dicitur: est id quod est 
materiatum, uel quod est Filius; hic uero proprietatis, cum dicitur: est materiata, uel est Filius. Substantia uero 
eadem est, proprietates uero impermixtae sunt” and Wilks, “Peter Abelard,” 369–384. As shown by Wilks (ibi, 
372, n. 25), Abelard employs at least three kinds of “essential-predication locutions,” that is, locutions that 
involve essential but not adjacent predication or, as Wilks states, locution that “relate the thing corresponding to 
the subject term with the thing, not the property, corresponding to the predicated term” (ibi, 378): (i) the id 
quod-phrase (“est id quod est bonus”), (ii) the res-phrase (“est bona res”), and (iii) the neuter inflection (“est 
bonum”). 
93 Moreover, it cannot be inferred from “the individual is that which is universal” (which is true) that “the 
individual is predicated of many” (which is false). 
94 See texts on n. 25. 
95 See LI 16.2–18; cf. also LI 15.36–16.2.  
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96 As an anonymous referee put it, the individuum-theory seems to be caught between a rock and a hard place 
with respect to contemporary criteria of parsimony and explanatory power. On the one hand, it looks like the 
individual thing is asked to do too much explanatory work — unless the status of things become more and more 
thing-like in order to serve as adequate truth-makers. But then, on the other hand, these quasi-thing-like status 
appear to violate the consideration of parsimony that led the individuum-theorist toward grounding universality 
on individuals in the first place. 
97 See arguments against the individuum-theory in LI 15.23–16.18; LNPS 518.28–521.20; GS §§ 51–73; QG 
§§ 36–51; P17 ff. 123vb–124rb, 125va–126ra.  
98 See above, n. 20.  
99 Spade, Five texts, xiv compares the individuum-theory to the view of Henry of Harclay over universals, as 
criticised by Ockham.  
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